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Introduction: The Dynamics and Negotiability of Customary Tenure 
For many years scholars, policy makers and donors have debated whether 
tenure security, increased productivity and poverty reduction could best be 
achieved through customary land use arrangements or through state led 
registration programs. In the first decades after independence many African 
countries witnessed attempts at land tenure reform through state programs of 
titling and registration. Disappointment with the effects of these programs com-
bined with the realisation that customary tenure systems are the dominant 
existing reality, have led to a renewed interest in customary land tenure sys-
tems. Issues of equity and security are, however, still of particular concern. 
This article describes the tendency to describe customary tenure systems in 
terms of negotiability and flexibility. This is a welcome response to notions of 
‘customary tenure as a pre-colonial code of fixed rules’ (Woodhouse 2003: 
1712) and corresponding ideas that customary land tenure systems are unable to 
adopt new institutions and mechanisms for dealing with a changing environ-
ment. This article warns, however, for an overemphasis on the negotiability of 
customary tenure. Generalising the powers of negotiation of local actors in 
contestations over land obscures the limits to the agency of some people, as 
arising from the stratification of local communities, and paints an overly 
positive picture of customary tenure. Such a picture sends a wrong signal to 
policymakers interested in customary tenure systems, as it allows them to 
neglect the inherent injustices and to overlook issues of social differentiation 
and inequality.  
The recognition of the dynamics and flexibility of customary land tenure 
systems largely originates within social science research, such as in the works 
by Berry (1993, 2001), Juul and Lund (2002: 3); Shipton and Goheen (1992: 
308-11); and Toulmin, Lavigne Delville and Traoré (2002). Berry (1993; 
2001), for instance, describes African land tenure systems as adaptive 
arrangements, of which the rules have remained ambiguous, and the rights are 
subject to ongoing reinterpretation. People’s access to land is therefore linked 
                                                          
 
1  Parts of this article have been published in ‘Negotiated or negated? Rhetoric and 
reality of customary tenure in an Ashanti village in Ghana’, Africa 78(2), p. 264-287 
and ‘Customary tenure security: Wishful policy thinking or reality? A case from 
peri-urban Ghana’, Journal of African Law 51(2), 215-248. 
50 Janine Ubink 
 
to membership in social networks, influenced by relations of authority and 
obligation, and dependent on successful participation in processes of 
interpretation and adjudication. Juul and Lund (2002: 4) similarly see property 
rights as institutions which ‘are only as robust, solid and enduring as the 
ongoing reproduction or re-enactment which enables them to persist’. They 
argue that the negotiability of customary tenure not only results from the nature 
of the customary system but also from functioning within an arena 
characterised by legal and institutional pluralism combined with a state unable 
or unwilling to fix the rules and ensure constancy and compliance. This 
encourages people to renegotiate social identities and entitlements in order to 
either confirm or change it (cf. Amanor and Ubink 2008: 11). 
In line with the above, customary property regimes are now often analysed 
in terms of processes of negotiation, in which people’s social and political 
identities are central elements, and are also becoming contested terrain (Berry 
2002b; Juul and Lund 2002). Peters (2002: 46-7) identifies three basic positions 
in the literature with regard to the negotiability of customary tenure. The first 
argues that the ambiguity and negotiability of customary tenure leads to a 
pervasive insecurity of rights of producers and to a lack of investment and 
inefficient uses. This view was dominant from the 1960s to the 1980s (Acock 
1962; Feder and Noronha 1987; Yudelman 1964) but it has now been largely 
abandoned. The second position identifies the negotiability and ambiguity of 
relations over land as a reflection of defining features of African societies, such 
as the hold social relations have over economic action, the dependence of 
individual actors on social networks to gain access to resources, and 
malfunctioning states. The fact that people’s access to land is closely linked to 
membership of social networks and participation in political processes is seen 
to open up possibilities of access to land for the poor and not as necessarily 
engendering insecurity and increasing inequality (cf. Berry 1993: 104). 
Scholars such as Platteau (2000), Toulmin and Quan (2000), and Toulmin, 
Lavigne Delville and Traoré (2002) now appear to favour the second position, 
although ‘with sufficient unanswered questions to leave open the possibility of 
accepting the third’ (Woodhouse 2003: 1706). The third view holds that the 
ambiguity and negotiability of customary tenure has not prevented people from 
investing in production and in social networks to establish their access and 
control over property but lead to increasing inequality because some people are 
in a better bargaining position than others and there are limits to negotiability 
and ambiguity (cf. Berry 2002b: 219; Woodhouse 2003: 1705-6). Authors such 
as Cousins (2002), Daley and Hobley (2005), Juul and Lund (2002), Lund 
(2000), Peters (2002), Shipton (2002) and Woodhouse (2003) support the third 
position based on mounting evidence of land appropriation by influential elites 
and increasingly restricted and insecure access to land (see, for instance, 
Abudulai 1996; Downs and Reyna 1988: 18; Simo 1996: 49; Swindell and 
Mamman 1990: 177). They point to the fact that negotiators or contestants in 
customary land matters seldom operate on level playing fields. ‘Some have 
more negotiating power, more defining and contesting power, than others’ 
(Shipton 2002: X). ‘When competition for land intensifies, the inclusive 
flexibility offered by customary rights can quickly become an uncharted terrain 
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on which the least powerful are vulnerable to exclusion as a result of the 
manipulation of ambiguity by the more powerful’ (Woodhouse 2003: 1715). 
Ambiguity offers room for manoeuvre to small farmers and modest rural 
producers, but, at the same time, is exploited by the privileged in order to 
obtain advantage (Peters 2002: 53). These studies also show that not everything 
is negotiable: ‘porous boundaries and fluid, malleable identities too have their 
limits. There are some groupings and roles to which humans get ascribed and 
from which they have no escape’ (Shipton 2002: X). Based on these 
considerations, Peters (2002: 47) proposes that ‘we may have gone too far in 
the emphasis on negotiability, ambiguity and indeterminacy of land … rights’, 
and suggests that ‘we need to pay more attention to the limits of negotiability 
and ambiguity – to the cases where claims do ‘stick’ and, critically, to invest-
igate the connection between these cases and socio-economic differentiation 
and class formation’.  
The current article aims to contribute to this new emphasis on the limits of 
negotiability. It examines the scope of negotiability of customary tenure and the 
power relations at play in a peri-urban area in Ghana where land is at the centre 
of intense and unequal competition and closely tied to struggles over authority. 
After a brief introduction of customary tenure in Ghana, it zooms in on local 
struggles around residential land in the village of Besease. These local struggles 
provide a grassroots view of processes of negotiation and contestation of 
customary rights to land. In this way, the story of Besease opens small but 
meaningful windows on local contestations for rights to land and serves to 
illuminate the capacity and opportunity of various local actors to negotiate their 
positions. These local struggles will be placed in a broader perspective through 
a discussion of the power of chiefs in Ghana, the existence of traditional checks 
and balances on their functioning, and the actions and discourse of the 
Ghanaian government towards chiefly administration. In the conclusion, I will 
come back to the question of the usefulness of placing all local contestations for 
land under the term ‘negotiations’ and show that such a characterization risks 
undercutting the significance of local stratification and ignoring the winners 
and losers of uncertain rules.  
This article is based on sixteen months of fieldwork undertaken in 2003, 
2004 and 2005 as part of a PhD-research into customary land management by 
traditional authorities in peri-urban Ghana. The main research question of that 
study dealt with the local functioning of customary legal systems and 
traditional rule and the way officials apply and interpret customary law. 
Besease was the initial fieldwork site and operating base from which to visit 
eight other peri-urban villages, all within a range of ten to 40 kilometres from 
Kumasi. In the nine villages I combined participant observation with semi-
structured interviews with farmers, chiefs, elders, youth leaders, local 
government representatives, and religious leaders. I supplemented the 
qualitative research with quantitative data, obtained by conducting a survey 
among 240 households. The local fieldwork was combined with regular visits 
to the district capital Ejisu, the regional capital Kumasi, and the national capital 
Accra, to interview judges, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, policy makers, 
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academics, and donors on the one hand, and to study literature, policy 
documents, court records, and archival records on the other.2 
Customary Land Tenure in Ghana 
In Ghana, the ‘customary’ dominates both property rights and allocational 
authority: 80% of land is regulated by customary law, with a decisive role for 
traditional authorities.3 Although stool4 land administration is largely the 
domain of the traditional authorities, the government is to a certain extent also 
involved in stool land administration, for instance through the collection and 
distribution of stool land revenue, the requirement to provide consent and 
concurrence for allocations of stool land, and through land use planning.5 
However, in 2003 Ghana started a Land Administration Project, a long-term 
programme with multi-donor support, under which the government would pass 
its responsibility for the management of stool lands to customary land 
secretariats under the aegis of the traditional authorities (DFID/Toulmin, 
Brown, and Crook 2004; Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003: 12).6 This 
project is expected to enhance the pivotal position of traditional leaders in 
Ghanaian land management.  
The evolution of customary tenure in Ghana has been described by scholars 
such as Alden Wily and Hammond (2001), Amanor (1999, 2001), Berry (1993, 
2001, 2002a), Boni (2006), Lentz (2006) and Lund (2006), who differ in their 
approach. While Berry, for instance, invariably stresses the flexibility and 
negotiability of customary tenure, Amanor (2001: 16) cautions that ‘defining 
the customary as flexible, adaptive, dynamic and hybrid creates problems for 
examining processes of change, since change has now become an intrinsic 
feature of institutions rather than a product of struggle between different social 
forces’. All authors do agree, however, that property relations are subject to 
intense contestation in cases where access to wealth and authority are 
undergoing rapid change. 
In line with this observation, the current article focuses on peri-urban 
Kumasi, and particularly on the village Besease, where such changes are 
salient. Due to urbanization and population growth, peri-urban areas are 
witnessing a high demand for residential land, which is triggering struggles 
over the rights to allocate village land that is being cultivated by community 
members, for residential purposes. As a result, in peri-urban areas the role of 
                                                          
 
2  This research has resulted in a book with the following title: In The Land of the 
Chiefs: Customary law, land conflicts, and the role of the state in peri-urban Ghana, 
Leiden University Press, 2008 (Ubink 2008a). 
3  See Sections 36 (8) and 267 (1) of the 1992 Constitution. 
4  Customary land is also called stool land, as the stool, the chief’s throne, symbolizes 
the traditional community. The installation and deposition of a chief are called 
‘enstoolment’ and ‘destoolment’. 
5  See Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481); Lands Com-
mission Act, 1994 (Act 483); Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462).  
6  See Ubink and Quan 2008. 
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traditional authorities in customary land management is shifting ‘from 
stewardship to ownership’ (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001: 96).  
Besease 
Besease used to be a village of subsistence farmers but with the growth of 
Kumasi – the second largest town in Ghana and located only 23 kilometres 
from Besease – it has become a popular residential area where land is a 
valuable asset, now selling for more than Cedis 10 million (almost €1000) per 
residential plot.7 The village houses five chiefs. The first is the Beseasehene, 
the chief (ohene) of Besease, who also serves as the Akwamuhene and 
Baamuhene subchief of the paramount chief of the area, the Ejisuhene, who 
resides in the district capital Ejisu.8 The second is the Kontihene subchief of the 
Beseasehene. The other three chiefs are also subchiefs of the paramount chief: 
his Kontihene, Kyidomhene and Gyaasehene. The term ‘chief’ can be 
confusing as it is used to describe various levels of traditional leaders. This 
article features the Asantehene, the chief or king of all Asantes; the Ejisuhene 
paramount chief; the Beseasehene, a village chief; and a range of subchiefs of 
the paramount chief or the Beseasehene. All are referred to by the term ‘chief’. 
Subchiefs function as the chiefs’ councillors.9  
Four of the five residing chiefs ‘own’ land in Besease, with the fifth – the 
Kontihene of the Ejisuhene – ‘owning’ land in Ejisu. Ownership of land is a 
complicated concept since the ultimate title of stool land lies with the 
community, usufructuary interests with individuals or families, and the chief 
has been allocated the role of custodian. The multi-layered customary set-up 
allows considerable space for struggles to capture the new value of land. At the 
centre of these struggles lie issues of authority about allocating village land to 
outsiders for residential purposes and entitlements to the proceeds from such 
allocations. These contestations are taking place within communities and 
between the various levels of chieftaincy. A range of actors – farmers, families, 
family heads, chiefs, the paramount chief, local government representatives and 
‘foreign’ or local buyers of residential land – is struggling for land on the 
outskirts, and the revenues this can bring. Sometimes actors team up, in other 
struggles former allies become new enemies.  
                                                          
 
7  Although the Constitution (article 267(5)) prohibits the sale of customary land and 
only allows leases, nearly everyone talks about the ‘selling’ of land and many 
people, ‘sellers’ as well as ‘buyers’, seem to regard land allocations for residential 
purposes as definitive transfers. The allocation papers that I saw during my field 
research merely stated that plot x was allocated to person y, and did not mention the 
word lease or specify how long the allocation would be valid for.  
8  The titles of subchiefs are not based on the names of their residence – as is the case 
with the Beseasehene and the Ejisuhene – but on their function. They either refer to 
the subchiefs’ original position in the chief’s army, for example, the Kyidomhene is 
the leader of the rear flank (Akyi: back, behind), or their administrative function in 
the locality, for instance, the Baamuhene takes care of the royal cemetery (Baamu: 
mausoleum). 
9  The councillors of lower chiefs are called elders.  
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Table 1: Explanation of the position of the various chiefs  
Title of chief Level of chieftaincy Residence  
Asantehene   Chief of all Asantes Kumasi 
Ejisuhene  Paramount chief  Ejisu 
Beseasehene/ 
Akwamuhene/ 
Baamuhene 
Village chief of Besease 
and subchief of Ejisuhene 
Besease – landowner 
Kontihene Subchief of Ejisuhene Besease – owns land 
in Ejisu 
Kyidomhene Subchief of Ejisuhene Besease – landowner 
Gyaasehene Subchief of Ejisuhene Besease – landowner 
Kontihene Subchief of Beseasehene Besease - landowner 
 
The paramount chief in the area of study is infamous for his style of land 
management that lacks equity and pro-poor development. His own subchiefs 
have brought charges against him on that account, at the Asantehene’s court.10 
The Ejisuhene for his part tried to destool a number of his own subchiefs, 
including the Besease-based Kyidomhene, Gyaasehene and Kontihene, because 
they did not agree with his land management. These depositions were not 
accepted by the families concerned, whose consent the Ejisuhene had failed to 
seek before taking action. Until these cases are settled, the subchiefs are not 
going to the Traditional Council in Ejisu but are still carrying on with most of 
their functions in Besease. The relationship between the parties has been 
thoroughly soured. At a certain point, the Ejisuhene even reported his subchiefs 
to the Regional Security Council for planning to assassinate him. However the 
council sent them home when they explained that they only wanted the 
Ejisuhene to account for his actions. ‘The Ejisuhene is now so afraid’, 
sniggered the Kontihene subchief of the Beseasehene, ‘that even when he goes 
over the rumble strips in Besease his car goes at full speed because his 
Kontihene lives on the main road’.11 The ruined relationship hampers the 
settlement of local disputes as the paramount chief – who has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to deal with destoolment charges – is unable to discipline his 
subchiefs. 
Due to its unusual set-up with four land-owning chiefs, Besease offers four 
cases for studying agency and resistance in land struggles at various levels and 
in different arenas. In the following section, a number of struggles around the 
right to sell village land for residential purposes will be discussed. 
                                                          
 
10  During my last field visit, in 2005, the case was still pending.  
11  Interview, 1 July 2003. 
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The Right to Sell Land for Residential Purposes: Cases from Besease 
The right to sell village land under cultivation by community members to 
outsiders for residential purposes is a highly contested issue in Besease. Some 
say that it belongs to the farmers and their families who have been cultivating 
the land for generations and passing it on to family members through gifts and 
succession. Others rather claim that it devolves to the chiefs who also have the 
right to allocate unused land to outsiders.12 These differing opinions not only 
find expression in normative statements, but also in various actions regarding 
land transfers. This can be illustrated by a number of cases. 
The first case features the former Beseasehene who, at some point, 
demarcated a piece of farmland, which was being cultivated by a farmer from 
another family, into eight residential plots. The chief sold seven of these plots 
and gave the last one to the family concerned. The current Beseasehene sold the 
last eighth plot and the family was first aware of this when the buyer started to 
develop the land. A quarrel broke out between the chief and the family but the 
chief refused to give the family another plot, and ‘brought macho people in’13 to 
restrain them. In contrast to this, the Beseasehene did not get his own way in a 
different case in which he sold a plot of land belonging to yet another family. 
As soon as the buyer started building on this piece of land, he was restrained by 
the infuriated family. The buyer then went back to the chief who approached 
the family to plead with them to settle the conflict but they were adamant and 
the chief almost got beaten up. The chief then had to compensate the buyer. A 
last case involving a former Beseasehene dates back to 1973, when Mr O. 
approached the Beseasehene about buying a piece of land on the other side of 
the road, near the station. After he had bought it, the land turned out to belong 
to the Kyidomhene. The two chiefs reached an understanding but Mr O. ended 
up with only a small part of the land he had bought, an outcome he felt unable 
to challenge.  
A different chief who wanted to sell some land, which in this case belonged 
to his own family, is the Gyaasehene. One of his predecessors had given a large 
                                                          
 
12  According to authoritative interpretations in case law, the usufructuary interests of 
indigenous farmers and families on their land can be extinguished only through 
abandonment, forfeiture or with consent and concurrence of the interest holder. The 
usufructuary cannot be deprived of any of the rights constituting the interest, not 
even by the chief. This would seem to exclude the possibility of chiefs converting 
and selling subjects’ farmland without their consent. It is less clear whether the 
usufructuary him/herself could convert his/her own farmland to residential land. It is 
thought that he/she needs to ‘inform’ the chief of any intentions to do so but it 
remains ambiguous as to whether it should be done before or after the conversion, 
whether this merely means informing the chief or whether it involves the chief’s 
consent and, if so, on what grounds a chief could withhold his consent. Obviously 
these issues determine a chief’s bargaining position regarding revenue from the land 
involved. See for an analysis of customary land law in the Ghanaian courts and a 
comparison with peri-urban practices, Ubink 2002-2004. 
13  Interview assemblyman, 14 April 2003. 
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tract of land to the Catholic church on the understanding that it would start a 
school on part of the land. When the Catholics failed to honour their promise, 
the current Gyaasehene approached the Bishop who returned part of the land to 
the chief. The Gyaasehene, instead of giving it back to his family, sold the land 
to outsiders and pocketed the proceeds. When the chief’s family discovered his 
action, they initially wanted to destool him but this would have involved the 
Ejisuhene, with whom the family was still angry for his attempt to destool the 
Gyaasehene without their consent. After extensive deliberations therefore, the 
family decided to keep the Gyaasehene on the stool but sent him away from 
Besease to avoid his meddling in land matters.  
It is not only the chiefs who are selling land. A.D., a Kyidomhene elder, 
also sold some plots of family land. According to him, he sold the land to raise 
revenue to renovate the family house but his nephews claim that he sold more 
plots than was necessary for this purpose alone. When asked whether the 
chief’s permission was required to sell land, A.D. replied that things were 
changing. ‘It depends on the animosity between the seller and the chief. The 
chief has to sign the land allocation paper and the site plan. But we first sell and 
then we go to the chief.’14 He later explained that his family has three houses or 
‘gates’ from which the Kyidomhene is selected, and the people from these three 
houses can sell their own land, whereas others cannot.15 When the Kyidomhene 
heard this, he stated angrily: ‘A.D. was wrong when he said that members of 
the three gates can sell their own land. He said that because he has sold seven 
plots.’16 A.D. does not have a bad relationship with the Kyidomhene however 
because when the Ejisuhene tried to destool the latter, A.D., who is next in line 
to the Kyidomstool, refused the position. A.D. is thus not just any member of 
the family and he fully acknowledges that it ‘depends on your importance in the 
family’ as to whether you can get away with selling your own land or can 
negotiate a fair price when the chief is selling it.17 
A number of commoners also found ways to sell their land, although with 
some involvement by the Beseasehene. The following cases centre on the 
interpretation of history. When the town started to expand during the reign of 
the former Beseasehene at the beginning of the 1990s, the chief announced that 
anybody could sell the land he was farming. According to some, the 
Beseasehene’s statement only referred to land belonging to his own family, 
others took it to have a much wider meaning and to cover all the land in 
Besease. The Aduana family in Besease, who had been given farmland by the 
Kontihene subchief of the Besease when they arrived in the village, seized the 
opportunity to sell their lands and went to the Beseasehene to sign the 
allocation papers, thus bypassing the Kontihene. The deal was of mutual benefit 
to the Aduana and the Beseasehene, since the first could sell their land without 
involving the Kontihene, while the latter could receive a 10% signing fee on 
                                                          
 
14  Interview, 7 May 2003. 
15  Interview, 7 May 2003. 
16  Interview, 19 June 2003. 
17  Interview, 22 May 2003. 
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land that was not his. When the Kontihene discovered the sales, he wanted to 
take the Aduana to court but felt he could not do so because they were half-
brothers and sisters. Besides this, ‘all the plots have been sold and the money 
squandered’.18 A similar story was told by the Kyidomhene:  
‘People with Kyidomland knew that I would not agree [to selling the land] and sign 
their allocation papers, so they went to the Beseasehene for a signature. When I 
heard about it, I could not do much about it. I called the people with a letter and sent 
a copy to the Beseasehene and Ejisuhene but I did not pursue it. I did not want to 
take my own family to court.’19  
Whether the chief is the one to sell the land, or merely the one who signs the 
allocation paper, many people think that the chief has to be involved at a certain 
point. If a buyer wants to obtain a building permit from the District Assembly, 
his allocation paper will need to be signed by the chief, who will demand a 
signing fee for this service. A much debated question in Besease, however, is 
which chief needs to be involved. The Beseasehene posits that all allocation 
papers in Besease need his signature, whereas the other land-owning chiefs 
claim they can sign their own allocation papers. This dispute is tied up with the 
issue of authority. The Beseasehene claims that since he is the chief of Besease, 
he is superior to the other chiefs, at least regarding Besease lands. But 
according to the Kyidomhene and Gyaasehene, there is no hierarchical 
relationship. Both claims are grounded in their own versions of history. 
The following case illustrates this struggle. The Kontihene sold thirty-two 
plots of land. When the Beseasehene heard of the sale, he – as self-proclaimed 
overlord of the land – claimed Cedis 40 million (approximately €4000) of the 
revenue. The Kontihene however refused to pay, even after the Beseasehene 
reduced his demand to Cedis 28 million.  
Another inventive attempt by the Beseasehene to capitalize on his position 
proved equally unsuccessful. He personally went to the homes of all the people 
who had bought residential land from previous Beseasehenes, claiming that he 
should renew the signature on their allocation papers, a service for which he 
demanded a substantial signing fee. He went, for instance, to the house of Mrs 
O., who bought a tract of land from the then Beseasehene twenty years ago. He 
ordered Mrs O.’s mother, who lives in the house while her daughter lives in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region, to come to his house to get a new signature. But after 
consulting Mrs O. and her husband, she decided not to go. The chief also went 
to the house next door, where eighty-four-year-old Mrs A. told him that the 
papers were with her children in South Africa and that he had no right to see or 
sign them. A fight developed and insults were thrown by both sides. To another 
lady, Mrs S., he said that at the time of the sale, the land had been sold too 
cheaply and that he now had to sign the papers again. It was rumoured that she 
had gone to the chief’s house for his signature, and was made to pay Cedis 1.2 
million (approximately €120), but during the interview she denied the story. 
                                                          
 
18  Interview, 1 July 2003.  
19  Interview, 19 June 2003. 
58 Janine Ubink 
 
‘He is cheating us. I am not taking my papers there’ was her firm response.20 
Tellingly, the Beseasehene took no further steps to enforce ‘his right’ in these 
cases. 
Although the cases above are described only concisely, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn from them.21 When we compare the last two cases, 
where the house owners resisted the Beseasehene’s claims for a renewed 
signature and his subchief refused to share revenue from land sales with him, 
with the earlier cases, we can conclude that it is much easier to resist claims for 
money or a renewed signature than to fight an established sale. This 
demonstrates the crucial significance of the power to initiate sales. Whether this 
initiative is taken by commoners or chiefs, the other contestants are often 
unable or need a lot of force to undo any established sales or to claim part of 
the revenue. Even chiefs, when confronted with established sales, do not 
always see the chance of reversing them to claim part of the revenue or to 
discipline the sellers in any other way, especially if the sale involves a larger 
group of people or the chief’s own relatives.   
Nevertheless, the initiator of a sale does not always get away with his 
actions. The first two cases demonstrate that the outcome of chiefs’ attempts to 
appropriate rights in family land can be changed by the actions of a family, and 
depend amongst others on the family’s power – determined by such 
characteristics as size, connections, economic capital – and their willingness to 
act and use force. The case featuring the Gyaasehene selling land returned by 
the Bishop demonstrates that a chief faces the greatest danger if he sells land 
that belongs to his own family, which has more direct power in disciplining the 
chief.  
The cases also demonstrate that the stratification in Besease is more 
complicated than a simple opposition chief-commoners. Just as there are 
various levels of chiefs, commoners do not form a homogeneous group but 
should be differentiated on the basis of their ‘capital’, such as their property, 
power, connections and knowledge. Furthermore, the multi-chief configuration 
of Besease offers opportunities and challenges. On the one hand individuals 
and families can benefit from the animosity and rivalry between the chiefs, by 
selecting the chief most likely to co-operate on favourable terms. On the other 
hand, the presence of four land-owning chiefs complicates the process of 
bringing about accountable land management and equitable revenue sharing. 
Disagreements between the various chiefs in Besease and the paramount chief 
also show how the local and the supra-local are intertwined, and illustrate how 
contestations over land are intimately tied up with struggles over political 
power and authority. The Besease case furthermore shows that struggles both 
for land and political power, are intimately tied up with contestations of history. 
                                                          
 
20  Interview, 29 May 2003. 
21  See for a more elaborate discussion of cases Ubink 2008b. 
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The Strong Position of Chiefs 
Since selling land is profitable and those wishing to reverse established sales 
are often unable to do so, gains largely depend on the opportunity or ability to 
initiate sales. Although we saw cases where commoners had been able to sell 
their land, the prime actors in selling land were usually the chiefs. Bruce (1988: 
43) explains their strong position as follows:  
‘in many indigenous tenure systems a traditional leader who administers community 
land is viewed as holding a tenure in that land. This is best described as an estate of 
administration, held in trust, but where the land is unoccupied and rights to land are 
becoming increasingly individualized, the traditional leader is sometimes able to 
convert the administrative estate to a personal right.’  
In Besease, where there is no unoccupied land left, chiefs are now even 
attempting to acquire personal rights over occupied land under cultivation by 
community members. This has also been documented for other villages 
surrounding Kumasi and for other peri-urban areas of Ghana.22  
The customary system of land allocation, with the chief as the administrator 
of land, is obviously dominated by the traditional elite. We have seen that this 
does not mean that chiefs have unlimited and undifferentiated negotiating 
powers. Their room for manoeuvre and the success of resistance against their 
actions are highly influenced by the power configuration in the locality. The 
membership of social and political networks of both the chiefs and their 
opponents in the struggle, the social and economic capital of both these parties, 
the number of people they can mobilize, and the degree of physical force they 
are willing and able to use, all have an effect on the outcomes of struggles over 
land. Over the last decades, the power configuration in peri-urban areas has 
been profoundly influenced by the allocation of a number of administrative 
tools for land management in the chiefs. These tools, including the capacity to 
draw up planning schemes and demarcate village land into residential plots, 
have significantly enhanced the local position of chiefs. Although the power of 
chiefs to negotiate customary tenure differs per case depending on the local 
power configuration, it is in general influenced by two factors: the weakness of 
customary checks and balances and the government’s current policy of non-
interference in chiefly affairs.  
Customary Checks and Balances 
Traditionally, responsibility for village chiefs rests on two pillars. The first 
pillar is made up of a council of elders, selected by and representing all major 
factions of the community, without whose consent the chief can not make any 
decision. The second pillar consists of the possibility to destool seriously 
malfunctioning chiefs (Busia 1951; Danquah 1928; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; 
Ollennu 1962). Assuming that traditional rule was never that equitable and 
                                                          
 
22  See among others Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Bassett 1993: 
17; Berry 2002a; Edusah and Simon 2001; Hammond 2005; Kasanga and Kotey 
2001; Kasanga and Woodman 2004; Maxwell et al. 1998; Ubink 2007. 
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well-balanced – which has been convincingly demonstrated in the extensive 
oeuvre of McCaskie (including McCaskie 1992; McCaskie 1995; McCaskie 
2000) – current performance of chiefs in peri-urban Kumasi proves that these 
two pillars have seriously eroded in present-day village practice in peri-urban 
Kumasi. 
To begin with, in some villages in peri-urban Kumasi, the council elders are 
primarily or even entirely selected from only the royal family and not from all 
important families in the community. Furthermore, the rule that elders hold 
their offices not in the pleasure of the chief but to serve the family that has 
elected them also seems to be under strain. This is underpinned by the 
abundance of conflicts between elders and their own family, who can no longer 
dismiss them when unsatisfied. Regardless of the composition of the council, 
the chief often co-opts his elders by sharing the benefits from land admi-
nistration with them, removing their incentives to effectively check the use of 
power and, if necessary, to stand up against the chief (cf. Abudulai 2002: 83). 
And those elders that are not co-opted are often simply ignored by the chief.23  
When the people of a community want to destool their chief, a case has to 
be brought before the Traditional Council, the administrative and ‘judicial’ 
organ at the level of the paramount chief, which consists of the paramount chief 
and his subchiefs.24 A first hurdle is that destoolment charges cannot be brought 
by commoners but only by the ‘kingmakers’, i.e. those subchiefs and members 
of the royal family who can also make or enstool a chief (Hayford 1970: 36). 
As discussed above, these subchiefs are often co-opted and are therefore not 
likely to take the lead in actions against the chief. And if they do dare to do so, 
this is only ‘after many years of wrongdoing, the chief will first be given the 
benefit of the doubt, according to one of the subchiefs of the Ejisuhene, and to 
explain why they have waited so long to start a destoolment case against the 
latter, he adds: ‘The kingmakers have deposed the previous Ejisuhene and 
installed this one, of whom they had high expectations. They now lose part of 
their legitimacy when they want to destool the one they selected’.25 A second 
obstacle lies in the fact that the paramount chief, who chairs the Traditional 
Council, often has a direct interest in who occupies the village stool, mainly 
because of his claims to a share in the villages’ land revenues. The paramount 
chief of Ejisu for instance favoured those chiefs who sold large amounts of 
stool land and shared the proceeds with him. The fact that this did not usually 
leave much land or revenue for the community did not seem to bother him. 
Furthermore, to mention a third hindrance, the members of the Traditional 
Council consist of direct colleagues of the chief-on-trial. Many of the current 
destoolment charges are to do with land administration in one way or another. 
And often the charges against the chief-on-trial, such as selling farmland and 
not using enough stool land revenue for community development, are also 
points of discussion in the villages of the judging chiefs. Clearly, their personal 
                                                          
 
23  See Ubink 2007. 
24  Section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). 
25  Interview Kontihene subchief of Ejisuhene, 27 May 2003. 
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interests in such cases may stand in the way of objective and impartial 
judgment.  
Governmental Policy 
The second factor structurally influencing the negotiating power of chiefs 
consists of the activities and discourse of the government. In the media, 
government officials regularly and vehemently proclaim that they will not 
‘meddle in chieftaincy affairs’.26 Land administration is the main area about 
which such ‘non-interference-statements’ are made. These statements not only 
claim that the government should not interfere in chieftaincy affairs, but also 
allege that it is unnecessary: since chiefs do not rule alone but in council with 
their elders, and since they can be destooled when they seriously malfunction, 
the local arena can deal with its own problems. Despite frequent indications 
that these local checks and balances are not very effective, the government 
takes refuge behind them, denying the people an opportunity to complain.  
These statements form an element of a wider ‘policy of non-interference’, 
which can also be witnessed in certain actions, such as the fact that at 
inauguration of District Assemblies and Unit Committees – the two lowest 
levels of local government – its members are invariably told to abstain from 
chieftaincy affairs. A salient example can also be found in the wording, drafting 
and content of the National Land Policy – the first comprehensive land policy 
ever formulated by the Ghanaian government – and its implementing program, 
the Land Administration Program.27 Although program and policy aim to tackle 
the current problems in land administration, both the role of chiefs in the 
administration of stool land – including the tendency of chiefs to adopt 
landlord-like positions – and the possible checks and balances the state could 
put in place regarding stool land administration, are not critically examined. 
There is an internal debate between modernizers and neo-traditionalists within 
government, which is quite intense and highly sensitive. The modernizers, 
particularly in the land agencies and the Land Administration Program Unit, are 
trying to break the silence surrounding the misadministration by the chiefs but 
their efforts are being thwarted by their superiors. Altogether, however, it 
seems that there is currently no political party willing to enter into any real 
battle, such as land reform would cause, with the chiefs.28 
                                                          
 
26  See a.o. Daily Graphic 25 August 2003, 3; Ghanaian Times 5 August, 2003, 1 and 
25 August, 2003, 3. These statements are sometimes made in reaction to chieftaincy 
disputes, for which the law explicitly declares the government has no jurisdiction 
(section 15, Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)), but also more in general, expressing 
that the government will not interfere in chiefly administration. 
27  A long-term programme with multi-donor support, which started in 2003 with the 
objective ‘to develop a sustainable and well functioning land administration system 
that is fair, efficient, cost effective, decentralized and that enhances land tenure 
security’ (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003: 12). See also Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry 1999: 99; Ubink and Quan 2008; World Bank 2003. 
28  Another example is found in the unwillingness of the political establishment to bring 
before the court the question whether ‘drink money’ is stool land revenue in the 
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The policy of non-interference can be explained partly by the political power of 
the chiefs, who are still regarded as very influential and vote-brokers, especially 
in the rural areas. In addition, the current tendency to fill chieftaincy positions 
with highly educated professionals blurs the traditional distinction between the 
state elite and chiefs, and creates new alliances between these two groups (Ray 
1992: 109-113). The elite of the party presently in power, the NPP, is especially 
closely connected to the chiefs. Not only does it have its stronghold in the 
Ashanti Region, with its powerful chiefs, but president Kufuor himself is 
through marriage connected to the royal family of the Asantehene. Many 
members of the current government, up to high levels, are royal family 
members in their hometown. Furthermore it could be argued that the rampant 
irregularities and mismanagement by state institutions in procedures of 
compulsory acquisition of land do not give the state a strong moral position 
from which to judge the quality of chiefly land administration (Kotey 1996). 
Moreover, when the state wants to acquire land itself, a good relationship with 
the chiefs involved is useful.  
The current mildly favourable climate for chieftaincy has even rekindled 
discussions on the creation of a second chamber of parliament made up of 
chiefs, and on whether chiefs should again have their own representatives on 
District Assemblies. The fact that chiefly statements on these issues at 
workshops and policy meetings often go unchallenged gives another indication 
of the affirmative attitude of the current government towards chiefs and 
chieftaincy issues. Obviously, such actions and discourse from the government 
provides chiefs with additional legitimacy and negotiability in the field of land 
administration, and communicates little fear for stately control and ample room 
for manoeuvre.  
Conclusion: Negotiations and Unilateral Actions 
The weakness of customary checks and balances and the government’s policy 
of non-interference in chieftaincy matters help to explain why in many cases 
the chief is able to benefit from the resources of the community. Over time, this 
would result in reduced access to land for the poor and increased socio-
economic inequality, a result confirmed by other research.29 The third position 
with regard to the negotiability of customary tenure described in the 
introduction to this article imputes the increased inequality under customary 
                                                                                                                                
 
sense of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) Act. In line with the 
historical practice to bring a bottle of schnapps when requesting a chief for land, 
chiefs claim that ‘drink money’ constitutes a mere symbolic gift to show allegiance 
to the chief. Since this ‘drink money’ currently equals the market price for land, 
many officials suggest it amounts to stool land revenue in the sense of the OASL 
Act, and should thus revert to the OASL. When the District Chief Executive of 
Ejisu-Juaben district wanted to go to court over a case of approximately 300.000 
Euro of ‘drink-money’, he was stopped by the government. See Ubink and Quan 
2008. 
29  See footnote 22. 
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tenure to the differentiated bargaining positions within a community and the 
limits of negotiability and ambiguity. Although the Besease case endorses both 
these aspects,30 I agree with Peters (2004) and Amanor (1999) who warn that 
too much emphasis on negotiability results in an overestimation of people’s 
agency and that the image of relatively open, negotiable and adaptive 
customary systems of landholding and land use obscures processes of 
exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation. In line with, but 
perhaps surpassing the argument of these authors, I wish to caution against 
misuse of the term ‘negotiability’. In instances when one party has the power to 
fully negate the other party’s rights or to unilaterally impose a new 
constellation of rights, it is overstretching the term to continue to speak of 
negotiations. We cannot say that it is the result of a negotiation when a chief 
sells a farmer’s land and refuses to pay any compensation. Practice in peri-
urban Ghana shows a range of interactions on a continuum from 1) negotiations 
where parties have more or less equal power, such as between chiefs, and 2) 
negotiations between parties with severely unbalanced power relations, such as 
between chiefs and poor farmers, to 3) unilateral actions where one party is 
presented with a fait accompli regarding an alteration in his/her rights to land 
but where resistance changes the outcome to a certain extent, and 4) unilateral 
actions where acts of resistance remain ineffective and the strongest party 
imposes a new constellation of rights or even negates all the rights of the other 
party. Juul and Lund (2002: 6) state that ‘just as poor and disadvantaged people 
may sometimes negotiate improvements to their lives, these may just as swiftly 
be negotiated away again’. I would like to argue that by using the word 
negotiation they present an incomplete and skewed picture that ignores a whole 
array of actions in which a powerful party one-sidedly abrogates or diminishes 
the other party’s rights. An overstretching of the term negotiation – or rather a 
continued use of the term when in fact negotiations have ended – is not only 
incorrect but also dangerous as it obscures the stratification of the local 
communities in which these processes take place, overemphasizing the positive 
aspects of customary tenure, while neglecting its injustices.  
References 
ABUDULAI, S. (1996) ‘Perceptions of land rights, rural-urban land use 
dynamics and policy development’, in: Ministère de la Coopération, 
                                                          
 
30  This research does not conclude that the increasing economic inequalities are solely 
or predominantly a consequence of customary tenure and negotiable land rights. 
Rather, these should be attributed to Ghana’s political economy, with the inter-
nalization of the market-driven inequalities of the global economy and the 
strengthened position of chiefs that is discernable since the overthrow of President 
Nkrumah in 1966, but especially pronounced during the current reign of President 
Kufuor. This research also does not mean to suggest that national legislation will 
necessarily make land management more equitable. It recognizes customary tenure 
as a fact of contemporary political life but warns about treating it as a panacea. 
64 Janine Ubink 
 
Overseas Development Administration, L'Université de Saint Louis, GRET 
& IIED (eds.) Managing Land Tenure and Resource Access in West Africa: 
Proceedings of a Regional Workshop held at Gorée, Sénégal, November 18-
22, 1996. London: IIED. 
ABUDULAI, S. (2002) ‘Land rights, land-use dynamics & policy in peri-urban 
Tamale, Ghana’, in: C. Toulmin, P. Lavigne Delville & S. Traoré (eds.) The 
Dynamics of Resource Tenure in West Africa. London: IIED. 
ACOCK, A.M. (1962) ‘Land policies and economic development in East and 
Central Africa’. Agricultural Economics Bulletin for Africa 1 (1), p. 1-20. 
ALDEN WILY, L. & D.N.A. HAMMOND (2001) Land Security and the Poor 
in Ghana. Is There a Way Forward?. DFID Ghana Rural livelihoods 
Program. 
AMANOR, K.S. & J.M. UBINK (2008) ‘Contesting Land and Custom in 
Ghana: Introduction’, in: J.M. Ubink & K. S. Amanor (eds.) Contesting 
Land and Custom in Ghana: State, Chief, and the Citizen. Leiden: Leiden 
University Press. 
AMANOR, K.S. (1999) Global Restructuring and Land Rights in Ghana. 
Research Report No 108. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
AMANOR, K.S. 2001. Land, Labour and the Family in Southern Ghana: a 
Critique of Land Policy under Neo-Liberalisation. Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
BASSETT, T.J. (1993) ‘Introduction: The land question and agricultural 
transformation in sub-Saharan Africa’, in: T. J. Bassett & D. E. Crummey 
(eds.) Land in African Agrarian Systems. Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
BERRY, S. (1993) No Condition is Permanent. The Social Dynamics of 
Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
BERRY, S. (2001) Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, 
and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996. Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
BERRY, S. (2002a) ‘The everyday politics of rent-seeking: land allocation on 
the outskirts of Kumase, Ghana’, in: K. Juul & C. Lund (eds.) Negotiating 
Property in Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
BERRY, S. (2002b) ‘Negotiable property: making claims on land and history in 
Asante, 1896-1996’, in: G.C. Bond & N.C. Gibson (eds.) Contested 
Terrains and Constructed Categories. Contemporary Africa in Focus. 
Boulder, Col.: Westview. 
BONI, S. (2006) ‘Indigenous blood and foreign labor: the ancestralization of 
land rights in Sefwi (Ghana)’, in: R. Kuba & C. Lentz (eds.) Land and the 
Politics of Belonging in West Africa. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
BRUCE, J.W. (1988) ‘A perspective on indigenous land tenure systems and 
land concentration’, in: R.E. Downs & S.P. Reyna (eds.) Land and Society 
in Contemporary Africa. Hannover, London: University Press of New 
England. 
BUSIA, K.A. (1951) The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System 
of Ashanti: a Study of the Influence of Contemporary Social Changes on 
Chiefs and Farmers 
  
  
65
Ashanti Political Institutions. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford 
University Press. 
COUSINS, B. (2002) ‘Legislating negotiability: tenure reform in post-apartheid 
South Africa’, in: K. Juul & C. Lund (eds.) Negotiating Property in Africa. 
Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
DALEY, E. & M. HOBLEY (2005) Land: Changing Contexts, Changing 
Relationships, Changing Rights. Paper for the Urban-Rural Change Team, 
DFID. 
DANQUAH, J.B. (1928) Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim 
Abuakwa Constitution. London: Routledge. 
DFID/TOULMIN, C., D. BROWN & R. CROOK (2004) Project memor-
andum: Ghana Land Administration Project Institutional Reform & Deve-
lopment: Strengthening Customary Land Administration. 
DOWNS, R.E. & S.P. REYNA, eds. (1988) Land and Society in Contemporary 
Africa. Hannover, London: University Press of New England. 
EDUSAH, S.E. & D. SIMON (2006) Land use and land allocation in Kumasi 
peri-urban villages. CEDAR/IRNR Kumasi paper 9, DFID Project R7330. 
Royal Holloway, University of London and University of Science and 
Technology, Kumasi 2001 [cited 6 April 2006 2006]. Available from 
http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/kumasi/Project_Related_Papers/Cedar_IRNR/Pap
er_9/paper_9.html. 
FEDER, G. & R. NORONHA (1987) ‘Land rights systems and agricultural 
development in sub-Saharan Africa’. Research Observer 2 (2), p. 143-169. 
HAMMOND, D.N.A. (2005) Protection of land rights and relations between 
state and customary authorities in Kumasi and Wa. Paper read at Workshop 
on Adjudication of Land Disputes, Legal Pluralism and the Protection of 
Land Rights in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, 17-18 February, 2005, at London. 
HAYFORD, J.E.C. (1970) Gold Coast Native Institutions: With Thoughts upon 
a Healthy Imperial Policy for the Gold Coast and Ashanti. London: Frank 
Cass & Co. Ltd. Original edition, 1903. 
JUUL, K. & C. LUND (2002) ‘Negotiating Property in Africa: Introduction’, 
in: K. Juul & C. Lund (eds.) Negotiating Property in Africa. Portsmouth: 
Heinemann. 
KASANGA, K. & N.A. KOTEY (2001) Land Management in Ghana: Building 
on Tradition and Modernity. London: IIED. 
KASANGA, K. & G.R. WOODMAN (2004) ‘Ghana: Local law making and 
land conversion in Kumasi, Ashanti’, in: G.R. Woodman, U. Wanitzek & H. 
Sippel (eds.) Local Land Law and Globalization: A Comparative Study of 
Peri-Urban Areas in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania. Münster: Lit Verlag. 
KOTEY, N.A. (1996) ‘The 1992 Constitution and compulsory acquisition of 
land in Ghana: Opening new vistas?’, in: Ministère de la Coopération, 
Overseas Development Administration, L'Université de Saint Louis, GRET 
& IIED (eds.) Managing Land Tenure and Resource Access in West Africa: 
Proceedings of a Regional Workshop held at Gorée, Sénégal, November 18-
22, 1996. London: IIED. 
LENTZ, C. (2006) ‘Is land inalienable? Historical and current debates on land 
transfers in Northern Ghana’. Paper presented at the colloquium, in: At the 
66 Janine Ubink 
 
frontier of land issues: social embeddedness of rights and public policy. 
Montpellier, France. 
LUND, C. (2000) African Land Tenure: Questioning Basic Assumptions. 
London: IIED. 
LUND, C. 2006) ‘Who owns Bolgatanga? A story of inconclusive encounters’, 
in: R. Kuba & C. Lentz (eds.) Land and the Politics of Belonging in West 
Africa. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
MAXWELL, D., W.O. LARBI, G.M. LAMPTEY, S. ZAKARIAH & M. 
ARMAR-KLEMESU (1998) Farming in the Shadow of the City: Changes 
in Land Rights and Livelihoods in Peri-Urban Accra. Ottawa: The 
International Development Research Centre. 
MCCASKIE, T.C. (1992) ‘Review article. Empire state: Asante and the 
historians’. Journal of African History 33, p. 467-476. 
MCCASKIE, T.C. (1995) State and Society in Pre-colonial Asante. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
MCCASKIE, T.C. (2000) Asante Identities: History and Modernity in an 
African Village 1850-1950. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
MINISTRY OF LANDS AND FORESTRY (1999) National Land Policy. 
Accra: Ministry of Lands and Forestry. 
MINISTRY OF LANDS AND FORESTRY (2003) Implementation Manual for 
Land Administration Project (LAP-1) (2003-2008). Accra: Ministry of 
Lands and Forestry. 
OLLENNU, N.A. (1962) Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
PETERS, P.E. (2002) ‘The limits of negotiability: Security, equity and class 
formation in Africa's legal systems’, in: K. Juul & C. Lund (eds.) Negoti-
ating Property in Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
PETERS, P.E. (2004) ‘Inequality and social conflict over land in Africa’. 
Journal of Agrarian Change 4 (3), p. 269-314. 
PLATTEAU, J P. (2000) ‘Does Africa need land reform?’, in: C. Toulmin & J. 
Quan (eds.) Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa. London: 
DFID/IIED/NRI. 
RAY, D.I. (1992) ‘Contemporary Asante chieftaincy: characteristics and 
development’, in: J. Sterner & N. Davis (eds.) An African Commitment: 
Papers in Honour of Peter Lewis Shinnie. Calgary: University of Calgary 
Press. 
SHIPTON, P. (2002) ‘Foreword’, in: K. Juul & C. Lund (eds.) Negotiating 
Property in Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann. 
SHIPTON, P. & M. GOHEEN (1992) ‘Introduction. Understanding African 
land holding: Power, wealth and meaning’. Africa 62 (3), p. 307-325. 
SIMO, J.M. (1996) Customary land tenure regimes in North-Western 
Cameroon: Evolution and interactions with wider economic and political 
development. Paper read at Managing land tenure and resource access in 
West Africa, November 18-22, at Gorée, Sénégal. 
SWINDELL, K. & A.B. MAMMAN (1990) ‘Land expropriation and accumu-
lation in the Sokoto periphery, Northwest Nigeria 1976-86’. Africa 60 (2), 
p. 173-187. 
Chiefs and Farmers 
  
  
67
TOULMIN, C., P. LAVIGNE DELVILLE & S. TRAORÉ (2002) ‘Introduction’, 
in: C. Toulmin, P. Lavigne Delville & S. Traoré (eds.) The Dynamics of 
Resource Tenure in West Africa. London: IIED. 
TOULMIN, C. & J. QUAN (2000) ‘Evolving land rights, tenure and policy in 
sub-Saharan Africa’, in: C. Toulmin & J. Quan (eds.), Evolving Land 
Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI. 
UBINK, J.M. (2002-2004) ‘Courts and peri-urban practice: Customary land 
law in Ghana’. University of Ghana Law Journal XXII, p. 25-77. 
UBINK, J.M. (2007) ‘Customary tenure security: Wishful policy thinking or 
reality? A case from peri-urban Ghana’. Journal of African Law 51 (2), p. 
215-248. 
UBINK, J.M. (2008a) In the Land of the Chiefs: Customary Law, Land 
Conflicts, and the Role of the State in Peri-urban Ghana, Law, Governance 
and Development. Leiden: Leiden University Press. 
UBINK, J.M. (2008b) ‘Negotiated or negated? The rhetoric and reality of 
customary tenure in an Ashanti village in Ghana’. Africa 78 (2), p. 264-287. 
UBINK, J.M. & J.F. QUAN (2008) ‘How to combine tradition and modernity? 
Regulating customary land management in Ghana’. Land Use Policy 25, p. 
198-213. 
WOODHOUSE, P. (2003) ‘African enclosures: A default mode of develop-
ment’. World Development 31 (10), p. 1705-1720. 
WORLD BANK (2003) Ghana Land Administration Project. Washington 
D.C.: World Bank. 
YUDELMAN, M. (1964) ‘Some aspects of African agricultural development’, 
in: E.A.G. Robinson (ed.) Economic Development for Africa South of the 
Sahara. Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic 
Association. London: Macmillan. 
